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Appellant/Cross-Appellee Charles C. Rehn ("Rehn"), by through his counsel, 
respectfully submits this Reply .Brief and Brief of Cross-Appellee. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-
103(2)G). 
I. CHRISTENSEN'S ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW. 
Appellee/Cross-Appellants Steve S. Christensen ("Mr. Christensen"), Steve S. 
Christensen, P .C. ("SSC") ( collectively, "Christensen"), Henroid Nielsen & Christensen, 
Christensen ("HNC"), Christensen, Corbett & Pankratz, PLLC ("CCP"), and Hirschi 
Christensen, PLLC's ("HC") (collectively, the "Appellees'')1 incorrectly state the issues of 
Christensen's appeal. 
Issue 1: Christensen alleges that Christensen's Lien was connected to the Property. 
Christensen's Lien was not connected to the Property. R. 390-2; 678-680; 970-972. 
Viewed in the light most favorable to Christensen, the sole possible connection stems from 
what Mr. Christensen purports was part of a conversation of approximately 10-15 minutes 
and amounting to no more than $30.00 in billable time. R. 392. The purported conversation 
occurred years before Christensen acquired the property. R. 390-1. Christensen either 
admitted these facts or failed to controvert these facts with any admissible evidence. R. 
378-80. 
1 It is unclear exactly whether the HNC, CCP, and HC are appealing given the statement in the Appellees' Opening 
Brief that Appellees and Cross-Appellants, include Mr. Christensen. 
1 
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Christensen alleges that Rehn agreed to a consensual lien. But Christensen 
judicially admitted that there was no agreement for a consensual lien. Paragraph 114 of 
Rehn's Verified Complaint states that "The Lien was also not authorized by agreement 
because there is no signed agreement between SSC and Rehn." R. 18. Christensen's 
Answer to Paragraph 114 states: "Defendants admit that there was no signed agreement 
authorizing the filing of the lien .... " R. 324. The trial court made a specific finding that 
"the Defendants have judicially admitted that there was no contractual right to record a 
lien." R. 1957. Christensen even admitted at trial that the Lien he recorded states it was 
recorded pursuant to statute and not pursuant to a contractual right to lien. R. 3944 at 
202:8-203: 18. Thus, the proper phrasing of Christensen's Issue No. 1 is: "Whether the trial 
court correctly granted summary judgment on the first two elements of Rehn' s slander of 
~i 
title claim where the undisputed evidence showed that Christensen's recorded Lien l. 
contained several false statements, sought more than what was owed, and where 
Christensen judicially admitted that the Lien was not authorized by any contract." 
Christensen's statement of the standard of review is also inaccurate. When 
reviewing a summary judgment ruling, "the mere existence of issues of fact does not 
preclude summary judgment. The issues of fact must be material to the applicable rule of 
law." Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983). 
Issue: 2: During trial, Christensen argued for a directed verdict because there was 
purportedly no evidence that he actually knew the Lien was an "unenforceable false lien." 
R. 3944 at 123:17-124:5. Christensen then only argued that there was no evidence of 
enforceability. Id. He did not argue about evidence of falsity. Id. Rehn then argued that 
2 
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under Dillon, Rehn only had to produce evidence that Clu-istensen knew his statements 
were false to prove malice, and that there was "lots and lots of evidence to support that 
finding." Id. at 124:8-14. Clu-istensen did not argue any fmiher, but instead stated when 
asked for his response "I don't have anything finiher on that, your Honor." Id. at 124:15-
18. On that basis, the trial court denied Christensen's directed verdict motion. Id. 124:19. 
Thus, Christensen never disputed that Rehn was only required to prove knowingly false 
statetnents by Christensen in order to prove that Christensen acted with malice. 
Accordingly, the issue was not preserved and is barred by the invited error doctrine. 
Under Utah law, "To preserve an issue for appeal, a litigant 'must enter an objection 
on the record that is both timely and specific."' Zavala v. Zavala, 2016 UT App 6, ,I 39 
(quoting State v. Rangel, 866 P.2d 607, 611 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). Indeed, it appears that 
Christensen's issue is barred by the invited error doctrine: 
Under the doctrine of invited error, however, Utah courts 'have declined to 
engage in even plain error review when counsel, either by statement or act, 
affirmatively represented to the trial court that he or she had no objection to 
the proceeding.' 
State v. Cheek, 2015 UT App 243, iJ 62 (quoting State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ,I 14). 
Christensen concedes that Rehn produced evidence of falsity at trial, "Admittedly, 
Relnl established that Christensen knew of some scrivener's errors in the notice of lien .... " 
Christensen's Brief at 14. Mr. Christensen's own testimony at trial proved that he knew of 
his errors. See, e.g., R. 3944 at 191:11-192:15; 193:8-194:23; 196:9-197:7. Utah law does 
not require evidence that Christensen lmew the lien was false and unenforceable, but rather 
3 
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that he knew it was untme or spurious. See Dillon v. S. Mgmt. Corp. Retirement Trust, 
2014 UT 14, iJ 36; R. 3945 at 123:14-124:18. 
If Issue 2 had been preserved, the proper phrasing of Christensen's Issue 2 would 
be: "Whether the trial court correctly denied Christensen's motion for directed verdict on 
the element of malice where ample undisputed evidence showed that Mr. Christensen made 
knowingly false statements in the Lien." 
~I 
Christensen misstates that the standard of review for a directed verdict is merely one ~1 
of correctness. The standard of review is actually far more deferential to the trial court. 
When an appellant challenges the denial of a motion for directed verdict 
based upon the sufficiency of the evidence, 'the applicable standard of v 
review is highly deferential.' 'A defendant must overcome a substantial 
burden on appeal to show that the trial court erred in denying a motion for 
directed verdict.' 
State v. Hawkins, 2016 UT App 9, iJ 32 (first quoting State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, iJ 30; ~,, 
then quoting Gonzalez v. State, 2015 UT 10, iJ 27) (emphasis supplied). Thus, Christensen 
bears a substantial burden of overcoming this Court's highly deferential view of the trial 
court's ruling. 
Issue 3: Christensen's phrasing of Issue 3 regarding the jury's award of attomef s 
fees fails to account for Jury Instruction No. 36 that specifically instructed the jury to award 
only feeds that were reasonably necessary. R. 3866. Christensen did not object to Jury 
Instruction No. 36. c;:;hristensen also did not put on any counter-evidence concerning the ~, 
reasonableness of attorney fees. R. 3866-8. Thus, the proper phrasing of Issue 3 is as 
follows: "Whether there was any basis in the evidence to support the jury's verdict and 
whether the trial court abused its sound discretion in denying Christensen's Motion for a 
4 
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·..,) 
New Trial when the only evidence produced at trial was that the claimed fees were 
reasonably necessary and the jury was specifically charged with evaluating the evidence to 
detennine if the claimed fees were reasonably necessary." 
Chtistensen's statement of the standard of review for a JNOVand motion for a new 
trial omits key limiting language. The Utah Supreme Court has declared that, 
Because it is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence, a jury 
verdict should not be regarded lightly or overturned without good and 
sufficient reason. Accordingly, a district court may grant a JNOV motion 
only if there is no basis in the evidence, including reasonable inferences that 
could be drawn therefrom, to support the jury's detennination. 
ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L. C., 2013 UT 24, iJ 18 ( citations and quotations 
omitted, emphasis supplied). Concerning a motion for a new trial, the Utah Supreme Court 
holds that, 
A motion for a new trial invokes the sound discretion of the trial court and 
appellate review of its ruling is quite limited. We will reverse a district 
court's ruling on a motion for a new trial only when there is no reasonable 
basis for the decision.... The district judge who presided over a trial is in a 
far better position than an appellate court to determined, for example, 
whether the evidence was sufficient to justify the verdict or whether jury 
awarded damages under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
Id. at iJiJ 21-22 (citations and quotations omitted). 
II. REHN'S RESPONSE TO CHRISTENSEN'S RECHARACTERIZATION OF 
REHN'S ISSUES ON APPEAL.2 
Issue 1: It is undisputed that Christensen asserted the enforceability of the October 
24, 1997 EngagementLetter(the "Engagement Letter") as a basis to recover. Christensen's 
Answer and Counterclaim explicitly asserted a right to recover "attorney fees and 
2 Issue 1 and 2 were preserved through Rehn's Motion for Attorney Fees. R. 3319-84; 3478-3610. 
5 
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costs ... incmTed in prosecuting its claims and defending itself in this legal action pursuant 
to its contract with Rehn." R. 333 ( emphasis supplied). Christensen continued to asse11 
the enforceability of the Engagement Letter multiple times after the trial court's sununary 
judgment rulings. See Christensen's Brief at 4, 7, 45-46. Thus, Rehn properly phrased his 
Issue 1 in Rehn's Brief because Christensen asserted a right under the Engagement Letter 
to recover attorney fees and costs incurred in prosecuting Christensen's counterclaim and 
defending himself against Rehn' s claims. 
Issue 2: Christensen admits that the trial court did not state whether it considered 
the fact that Mr. Christensen was Rehn's attorney when Christensen slandered Rehn's title. 
See Christensen's Brief at 48 n.30 and R. 3855. Mr. Christensen admitted under oath that 
Rehn was still his client when Christensen recorded the Lien, and that Christensen still 
owed Rehn a duty of undivided impeccable loyalty and undivided impeccable honesty at ~--
that time. R. 3944 at 168:10-20; 153:13-19. For these reasons, Rehn's Issue 2 is properly 
phrased in Rehn' s Brief. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, 
AND REGULATIONS. 
As stated in Rehn's Brief, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-826 is directly at issue in this 
case. UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-2-7 is also at issue in this case. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 38-12-
102 & 103 have been raised by Christensen, but these statutes are irrelevant given the 
specific language in UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-2-7. 
6 
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IV. RESPONSE TO CHRISTENSEN'S STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS. 
Christensen's Statement of Relevant Facts is extremely misrepresentative of the 
actual facts in this matter. One glaring example of this is Christensen's Representation that 
the Property was the "marital home" and "the central residence of this family for several 
years before ... the divorce." Christensen's Brief at 7, 21, and 33. Rehn's ex-wife filed for 
divorce in 1996. R. 3 at if 11 and 314 at if 11. Rehn did not even begin living at the 
Property until July of 1997, when Rehn rented the Property from Lindell Construction and 
Bruce Lindell ( collectively, "Lindell"), who signed an affidavit verifying this information. 
R. 529-530.3 Thus, Rehn did not even begin renting the Property until six weeks before 
his divorce trial. See R. 532; 548; 715. Perhaps that is why the judge presiding over Mr. 
Rehn's divorce explicitly ruled that there was "no real property owned by the parties and 
thus no allocation is necessary." R. 5-6; 390-391; 3944, 113:15-114:4, 156:1-158:6, 
160:24-161 :7. The only support that Christensen offers for his portrayal of the liened 
residence as being the "marital home" is page 2 of Christensen's own affidavit, and that 
actually says nothing about the Property being the marital home. R. 715. The liened 
property was not the marital home. 
Christensen alleges that Rehn had a "pre-divorce goal," but Christensen's only 
citation for this naked allegation is a page from Christensen's Opposition to Rehn's 
Summary Judgment Motion, which actually says nothing about a "pre-divorce goal" and 
3 Christensen did not challenge Mr. Lindell's affidavit R. 679. 
7 
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which e~pressly states that Christensen did not dispute Lindell 's Affidavit. R. 529-30; 679. 
Lindell' s Affidavit confinns that Lindell did not even offer to sell the Prope1ty to Rehn 
until 1999. Consequently, there is no evidence of a "pre-divorce goal," and the only 
evidence in the record that is relevant to the issues supports the conclusion that there could 
not have been a pre-divorce goal. 
Christensen alleges that he had a 15-minute conversation with Rehn regarding the 
Property during the divorce; yet, Christensen admitted at trial that he had no documentation 
of the alleged conversation. R. 3944 at 162:8-13. Christensen also admitted that he did 
not know what time of the day, what day, what month, or even the time of year that the 
conversation allegedly occWTed. Id. at 162:1-21. Christensen further admitted he did not 
even lmow whether the alleged conversation was in person or over the telephone. Id. at 
162: 17-19. Christensen also conceded that he could not remember anything about the 
alleged 12-year-old conversation except his undocumented advice about the Property. Id. 
at 164:12-19. 
Christensen alleges as fact that he possessed a contractual lien. This allegation 
contradicts Christensen's deposition testimony, trial testimony, judicial admission, and 
Christensen's subsequent confinnation of that judicial admission. In Christensen's 
Deposition and again at trial, Christensen admitted that when he drafted the Lien it was not 
based on a contract but rather on Utah's attorney lien statute. R. 3944 at 199:23-200:23. 
Christensen also stated in his Answer and Counterclaim that, "Defendants admit that there 
was no signed agreement authorizing the filing of the lien but deny any other allegations 
of fact in this paragraph." R. 324. Christensen later attempted to withdraw this judicial 
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admission by seeking to amend the Defendants' Answer and Counterclaim. R. 1661-4. 
Rehn vigorously opposed Clu·istensen's Motion to Amend, R. 1669-86, and Clu·istensen 
withdrew his motion to amend. R. 1949-51. By withdrawing his Motion to Amend, 
Christensen confirmed his p1ior judicial admission by stating: "Counsel has reviewed the 
matter and has determined that an amendment is not needed." R. 1949. 
Christensen alleges that he formed SSC ''immediately after" HNC dissolved in June 
of 1998. At trial, Mr. Christensen was forced to confirm his prior deposition testimony 
that he did not form SSC until at least March of 1999. R. 3 944 at 196:9-197 :7. Christensen 
was also forced to admit that he drafted the purported "assignment" ofRehn's account from 
HNC to SSC only after Mr. Rehn filed this action. Id. at 197:13-23. The purported 
assignment does not include any language that would render the effective date of the 
assignment to be prior to the filing of Mr. Rehn's action. Id. at 198:10-20 and R. 1068. 
Thus, Rehn established at trial that any attempt at assignment from HNC to Mr. Christensen 
or SSC did not occur until after this lawsuit began, i.e., approximately 12 years after 
Christensen recorded the Lien against Rehn. This directly contradicts what Christensen 
stated in the Lien, which was that Rehn hired SSC on September 29, 1995. R. 1063. 
Christensen states that by June 30, 2001, Rehn owed Christensen $26,000 related to 
the divorce. The Lien stated Rehn owed Christensen $26,807.14 for work associated with 
Rehn's divorce. R. 1063. However, Christensen's own prior bills to Rehn stated that Rehn 
only owed Christensen $6,198.19 ·in relation to the trial court divorce action as of the date 
the Lien was recorded. R. 393. Christensen's own records also demonstrated that some of 
the legal fees owed were for legal work unrelated to Rehn' s divorce. Id. and 98 7. 
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Christensen even admitted at tdal that the Lien contained amounts unrelated to Rehn's 
divorce. R. 3944 at 193:8-194:7. Because Christensen's own records show that the amount 
stated on the Lien included non-divorce work, Christensen knew that the amount of the 
Lien and its cmmection to Rehn's divorce was false. 
Christensen characterizes the falsehoods in the Lien as mere "mistakes" or 
"scrivener's errors." But the volume and severity of the false statements, combined with 
the manner in which the falsehoods work together to falsely portray the Lien, constitute '1iv 
strong circumstantial evidence of intentional deceit. The title "Amended Notice of Lien" 
is false because there was no prior lien. R. 3944 at 184:1-16. Christensen's attempt to 
portray that falsehood at trial as a "template error" was a recent invention, because· 
Christensen did not provide that explanation at his deposition. R. 3944 at 187 :3-189: 17. 
Christensen's recitation in the Lien that it was authorized pursuant to "Section 78-
51-41, of the Utah Code Ann., 1953" was designed to further bolster the appearance that 
the Lien was an "amended lien." R. 1063. The quoted statute had been repealed by the 
time Christensen recorded the Lien. R. 389. Christensen admitted as much at trial. R. 3944 
at 194:18-195:17. If Christensen had cited to the correct Attorney's Lien Statute in the 
Lien, it would have belied his attempt to make the Lien appear to relate back in time. 
Christensen stated in the Lien that the Property was awarded to Rehn in the 1996-
1997 divorce action. R. 1063. Rehn did not even acquire the Property until 2000, i.e., 
several years after the divorce action, and the divorce court declared in 1997 that no 
property was awarded in the divorce. R. 390. Christensen admitted at trial that this 
statement in the Lien was false. R. 3944 at 190:16-191 :24. As Rehn's divorce attorney, no 
10 
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one would know better than Christensen that Rehn was not awarded any real property in 
the divorce. Id. at 192:10-18. The only plausible explanation is that Christensen 
intentionally misrepresented this pruiicular fact to make the "Amended Lien" appear at 
least facially to be authorized by the Attorney's Lien Statute. 
Christensen stated in the Lien that Rehn hired SSC to commence work on Rehn's 
divorce on September 29, 1995. R. 1063. But Rehn is not the one who filed for divorce, 
and his ex-wife trigged the representation when she filed for divorce in 1996. R. 392. SSC 
did not exist until March of 1999, a fact that Christensen obviously knew as the creator of 
SSC. R. 392-393; 3944 at 196:9-197:7. The only explanation for these falsifications was 
to make SSC's lien rights facially appear to relate back to 1995. 
Christensen asserts that Rehn admitted to hiring Christensen in 1995. But what 
Rehn actually testified was that Rehn met Christensen in 1995 in "a get-together meeting" 
and that Rehn did not actually hire Christensen until 1996 when Mr. Rehn was served with 
divorce papers. R. 3945 at 19:21-20:7. Rehn never said he hired SSC or Mr. Christensen 
on September 29, 1995 as stated in the Lien. Id. and R. 1063. 
Christensen implies that he sent Rehn notice of the Lien in August of 2001. 
Christensen does so because UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-2-7(7) requires an attorney to give 
notice of an attorney's lien to the client within 30 days of recording the lien. Christensen 
recorded the Lien on July 25, 2001. R. 1063. But Christensen has judicially admitted that 
September 26, 2001 was the first notice of the Lien he sent to Rehn: 
REQUEST NO. 7: Please admit that Defendants failed to send any notice 
of the Lien to Rehn prior to September 26, 2001. 
11 
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RESPONSE: Admit. 
R. 977; See also R. 684. Clu-istensen likewise admitted at trial that the first time that 
Cln·istensen infonned Rehn of the Lien was September 26, 2001. R. 3944 at 113: 15-
114: 18; 261: 15-262:3. Clu·istensen admitted at trial that he did not send any notice to Rehn 
until Christensen learned that Rehn was going to refinance the mortgage on his home in 
September of 2001. R. 3944 at 173:8-175:18, 177:4-13. The fact that Christensen tried to 
record the Lien without giving notice, and then belatedly tried to cover himself when he ~ 
learned that Rehn would likely discover the Lien on his own is yet more uncontroverted 
evidence of intentional deceit by Christensen. 
Christensen contends that in January of 2002, Rehn agreed to pay $125 per month 
beginning in January 2002 and that Christensen would not charge interest under that 
payment plan. Christensen's own records prove that agreement never existed. The evidence 
showed that Christensen offered an arrangement in a letter to Rehn dated January 15, 2002 
that requested Rehn's signature. R. 988-9. But Rehn did not sign that letter. Id. 
Christensen then sent a follow-up letter, dated February 13, 2002, in which Christensen 
stated: 
I have not included incurring interest on the enclosed bills with anticipation 
of reaching an agreement with you. You indicated that you would be 
preparing an agreement in response to the letter I sent you a couple of weeks 
ago. 
R. 989. This statement by Christensen necessarily constitutes an admission that no 
agreement was in effect. (Christensen's spreadsheets show that Christensen charged Rehn 
interest in January 2002, February 2002, March 2002, and April 2002. R. 990-1) Put ~. 
12 
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simply, Christensen's own.letters and spreadsheets disprove Christensen's naked allegation 
that he had entered into a repayment agreement with Reim. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS. 
I. Christensen's own pleadings and admissions refute Christensen's arguments 
and demonstrate the Rehn is entitled to an award of attorney fees under UT AH CODE ANN. 
§ 78B-5-826 (the "Reciprocal Statute") as interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Hooban v. Unicity lntn'l, Inc., 2012 UT 40. Under Hooban any party may trigger the 
Reciprocal Statute by asserting the enforceability of a writing as a basis for recovery. 
Christensen triggeredHooban and the Reciprocal Statute when he invoked the Engagement 
Letter as a basis for recovering attorney's fees, including attorney fees incurred defending 
against Rehn's Slander of title Claim. Christensen has admitted in his Brief that he 
attempted to invoke the Engagement Letter to defeat Rehn' s slander of title claim. The 
Engagement Letter did have an attorney's fee provision, and if Christensen had succeeded 
in defeating Rehn's Slander of Title claim because of the Engagement Letter, Christensen 
would have been entitled to recover attorney's fees from Rehn. By putting Rehn at risk of 
paying attorney fees if Christensen's Engagement Letter defense prevailed, Christensen 
triggered reciprocal attorney fee liability under § 78B-5-826. Thus, the trial court erred by 
not awarding Rehn attorney fees pursuant to that statute. 
II. The trial court erred by deeming Christensen's conduct to be "standard" 
slander of title conduct. Rehn was Christensen's client, and Christensen owed Rehn 
fiduciary duties of undivided loyalty and impeccable honesty. Despite swearing an oath to 
honor those duties, Christensen intentionally crafted a fraudulent lien and then recorded 
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that li~n without even hinting to Rehn what Ch1istensen was doing. Then when Christensen 
learned that he was about to get caught, he lied to Rehn about the purpose of the lien. When 
Rehn asked Christensen to remove the lien, Christensen refused and ultimately demanded 
nearly $90,000 to remove a $26,000 lien. It turns out that this is a modus operandi for 
Christensen, as evidence by CFD Payson, LLC v. Christensen, 2015 UT App 251, Dahl v. 
Dahl, 2015 UT 23; and Dahl v. Christensen, 2009 UT App 280. Because of these facts, 
which Christensen concedes the trial court failed to consider, it was error for the trial court 
to charactedze this case as a run-of-the-mill slander of title case that was not worthy of an 
equitable award of attorney fees. 
III(a). Summary Judgment against Christensen was proper because sufficient 
evidence established that: ( a) Christensen recorded a false lien; {b) Christensen knew about 
the falsities in the Lien when he recorded it; and (c) the Lien jeopardized Rehn's sale of 
his Property. 
IIl{b ). Christensen's characterization of the Property as the "marital home" is 
simply untenable. Rehn didn't even begin living in the Property as a rental tenant until after 
his wife filed for divorce and he was weeks away from his divorce trial. Christensen's 
relianceuponBayHarbor Farm, LCv. Sumsion, 2014 UT App 133 is misplaced for several 
reasons including the fact that in Sumsion, the property was actually owned by the client 
when the legal work was performed. The present case is much more similar to the facts CL: 
of CFD Payson, LLC v. Christensen, 2015 UT App 251, wherein Christensen recorded an 
unlawful attorney's lien for a shocking $1. 6 Million in purported attorney's fees against a 
property that his former divorce client did not own or receive from a divorce decree. 
14 
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Christensen's fraudulent Lien is not the result of a few mere "hi-egularities," but rather the 
product of a premeditated design to create an illusory right to a lien where no actual right 
existed. 
III(c). Christensen did not possess a consensual lien because Christensenjudicially 
admitted that there was no contractual right to a lien. The Lien itself states that it is recorded 
pursuant to statute, and not pursuant to agreement. 
III( d). Any error at sunimary judgment was harmless because Christensen has 
conceded that at trial Rehn established the existence of false statements in the Lien and that 
Christensen knew of these false statements when he recorded the Lien. Thus, even if 
summary judgment had not established the first two elements of a slander of title claim, 
those elements were clearly established at trial. 
IV. Rehn established Christensen's malice at trial by proving that Christensen knew 
that the Lien was false and that Christensen dissembled to Rehn about the Lien's purpose. 
V. Christensen failed to present any evidence at trial that Rehn's attorney fees were 
unreasonable. Christensen also did not object to the jury instruction that specifically 
charged the jury with determining whether Rehn' s attorney fees were reasonably 
necessary. The jury had before it the entire catalog of billing entries from Rehn' s attorneys, 
and the jury determined that the fees that Rehn incurred were reasonably necessary. Thus, 
there is a sound evidentiary basis for the jury's award of attorney's fees, and no basis 
whatsoever to overturn that award. 
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I. 
ARGUMENTS 
REHN IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES UNDER 
HOOBAN AND UTAH'S RECIPROCAL ATTORNEY FEE STATUTE. 
Clnistensen argues that Rehn is not entitled to an award of attorney fees because 
-~ 
neither party asserted a contract as the basis of recovery. Christensen's argument is refuted G,ti 
by Christensen's own pleadings and admissions. 
As a threshold matter, Christensen's quotation of the Reciprocal Statute adds non-
existent language and omits other important language. In full, the Reciprocal Statute states: 
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a 
civil action based upon any promissory note, wlitten contract, or other 
writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory 
note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover 
attorney fees. 
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78B-5-826. Christensen inserts the word "only" in his quotation and 
omits the terms "promissory note," and "or other writing" to make it appear that fees may 
only be awarded when a mutually endorsed written contract so provides. The plain 
language of the Reciprocal Statute actually allows attorney fees to be awarded to a 
prevailing party when any "writing" allows at least one party to recover. There is no other 
limiting language. 
Christensen also ignores the fact that he is the one who asserted the enforceability 
of the Engagement Letter as a basis for recovery. The Utah Supreme Court defined what 
the phrase "based upon" in the Reciprocal Statute means when the Court held that, "an 
action is 'based upon' a contract under the statute if a 'party to the litigation asserts the 
writing's enforceability as a basis for recovery."' Hooban v. Unicity Intn '/, Inc., 2012 UT (L; 
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40, ~ 22. Under Hooban, when any pa1ty invokes the enforceability of a contract as a basis 
for recovery in either a defense or a prosecution of a claim, and also invokes an attorney's 
fees provision as a basis for fees as the prevailing paiiy, then Utah's Reciprocal Statute is 
triggered. 
Here, Christensen first triggered the Reciprocal Statute and Hooban when 
Christensen invoked the Engagement Letter's enforceability in his Answer and 
Counterclaim by stating: 
65. SSC is entitled to receive $26,807.14 plus contractual interest at the 
rate of 18% per annum from June 30, 2001. 
66. SSC is entitled to receive attorney fees and costs from the proceeds of 
the sale of the Sadclleback Property that it incurred in prosecuting its claims 
and defending itself in this legal action pursuant to its contract with Rehn. 
R. 333 (emphasis supplied). By invoking the Engagement letter as his basis to recover: (a) 
18% interest; (b) attorney fees and costs for prosecuting his counterclaim; and ( c) attorney 
fees and costs incurred in defending himself against Rehn' s claims, Christensen triggered 
the Reciprocal Statute and Hooban. Christensen's Brief concedes that he "asserted the 
existence of a contract in multiple instances and at multiple states of the litigation. Indeed, 
Appellees sought to enforce the contract through their counterclaim .... " Christensen's 
Brief at 45 (emphasis supplied). Christensen's Brief also concedes, "Later, Appellees 
asserted the contract's existence to prove a lack of the malice requisite for a slander of title 
claim." Id. at 46. These admissions by Christensen establish that Christensen's 
counterclaim was "based upon" the alleged enforceability of the Engagement Letter, and 
the Engagement Letter was used throughout the case as a defense. Christensen continued 
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to assert the Engagement Letter as a basis to avoid liability for slandering his client Rehn 's 
title. If Christensen had prevailed in that argument, Rehn would have been subject to an 
atton1ey fee award in Christensen's favor. 
Clu-istensen next argues that Rehn is not entitled to attorney fees because he failed 
to allocate those fees among Rehn' s causes of action. Christensen, however, ignores his 
own broadly stated invocation of the Engagement Letter's enforceability, which stated: 
SSC is entitled to receive attorney fees and costs from the proceeds of the 
sale of the Saddleback Property that it incurred in prosecuting its claims and 
defending itself in this legal action pursuant to its contract with Rehn. 
R. 333 (emphasis supplied). Christensen did not limit his alleged right to recover attorney 
fees to one or more specific claims that Rehn asserted. To the contrary, Christensen 
asserted a broad right to recover all of his attorney fees and costs in defending against 
Rehn' s "legal action" as a whole. By making such a broad invocation of a right to fees, 
Christensen subjected himself to a similarly broad award of fees. Nonetheless, Rehn 
allocated his fees at the trial court level as part of Rehn' s Memorandum seeking an award 
of attorney fees. R. 3408-9. 
Under Christensen's broad invocation, Christensen would have been entitled to all 
of his attorney fees incurred in defending himself had Christensen prevailed. Christensen 
thus put Rehn at risk of being forced to pay attorney fees and costs on any claim upon 
which Rehn did not prevail. It is therefore only fitting that Christensen be held to the same ~_, 
standard. To find otherwise would create an unequal playing field. 
Christensen also argues that Rehn is not entitled to any award of additional attorney 
fees because any entitlement to attorney fees is limited to contractual matters. But 
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Christensen invoked the Engagement Letter as his contractual defense to Rehn' s slander of 
title claim, and if Christensen would have prevailed in that contractual defense. Rehn would 
then have been subject to an attorney fee assessment as the non-prevailing patty. The fact 
that Rehn included all fees related to claims to which Clu·istensen invoked a contractual 
defense does not invalidate Rehn' s fee request. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO CONSIDER 
CHRISTENSEN'S BETRAYAL OF ms CLIENT AND ms PROFESSION. 
A. Christensen Knowingly Violated His Acknowledged Duties of 
Impeccable Honesty and Undivided Loyalty to Rehn. 
The trial court had the discretion to award attorney fees under its equitable powers. 
The trial court erred in failing to consider Christensen's betrayal of a client, and 
Christensen's betrayal of the legal profession as an aggravating factor in assessing 
Christensen's conduct. At trial, Mr. Christensen admitted when he recorded the Lien, Rehn 
was still Christensen's client and that Christensen owed Rehn a duty of undivided 
impeccable loyalty and undivided impeccable honesty. R. 3944 at 168:10-20; 153:13-19. 
Thus, Christensen knew that he had fiduciary duties of undivided loyalty and impeccable 
honesty to Rehn, and he nonetheless set out to falsify a lien and encumber Rehn's property 
under the most deceitful of circumstances. 
B. Christensen Intentionallv Violated the Attorney Lien Statute, Refused 
to Release the Falsified Lien and Forced the Present Action. 
After recording the slanderous lien, Christensen did not inform Rehn of the Lien 
even when the two met face to face. It was only after Christensen realized that his Lien 
might be discovered during Rehn' s refinance of his mortgage that Christensen was forced 
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to disclose the Lien. Christensen's initial withholding of the notice violated the Attorney's 
Lien Statute. R. 977; R. 3944 at 261 :25-262:3; and UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-2-7(7). When 
Cln·istensen finally did disclose the Lien to Rehn, Christensen dissembled and said it was 
to help Rehn refinance the Property, and that Cluistensen would remove the lien if it was 
not helpful to Rehn. R. 395; 3944 at 179:3-15; 182:4-22. Then when Rehn finally did ask 
Christensen to remove the Lien, Christensen refused to remove it unless Rehn paid 
t,;.,, 
~ 
Christensen over $43,000. Id. at 181:9-17; 205:12-206:7. Christensen then began ~ 
demanding even more money. Id. at 181:18-19. Christensen's final demand was for nearly 
$90,000. R. 551. Christensen's conduct is akin to extortion, and Christensen appears to 
have a particular penchant for inflating his demands for past due fees when his clients 
attempt to defend themselves from his unethical fee demands. See Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 
23, if1175-211; CFD Payson, LLCv. Christensen, 2015 UT App 251, 1if 3, 11-13. 
C. Christensen Used Contradictory Positions and Baseless Motions During 
Litigation in an Attempt to Exhaust Rehn. 
During litigation, Christensen took varying and contradictory positions, which 
required Rehn to incur heavy attorney fees to pin Christensen to any one position. R. 3345 
at 87:10-89:17. Christensen also filed baseless motions in an effort to exhaust Rehn. For 
example, Christensen judicially admitted in his Answer and Counterclaim that, 
"Defendants admit that there was no signed agreement authorizing the filing of the lien but 
deny any other allegations of fact in this paragraph." R. 324. Christensen later attempted 
to recast this judicial admission with a motion to amend the Defendants' Answer and 
~: 
Counterclaim. R. 1661-4. Rehn was then forced to show the inherent and fatal flaws 4:& 
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Christensen's Motion to Amend. R. 1669-86. In response, Christensen withdrew his 
motion to amend. R. 1949-51. Christensen then brought the same motion to amend on the 
eve of trial, and after representing to the trial curt that Christensen was ready for trial. R. 
3943 at 3:14-4:4; 27:6-23. Because of these facts, Rehn was forced to file a motion to 
strike Christensen's renewed motion to amend, which the trial court granted. Id. 
Also on the eve of tiial and after representing to the trial court that he was ready for 
trial, Christensen brought a second motion for summary judgment. R. 3943 at 3:14-4:1. 
This motion also required Rehn to stop trial preparations to file a motion to strike based 
upon the untimeliness ·of the Christensen's Motion and the fact that Christensen's Motion 
sought to relitigate previously decided issues, which the trial court partially granted. Id. at 
29:3-25. On the issues that the trial court did not strike, damages and laches, the trial court 
subsequently denied Christensen's second motion for summary judgment. R. 3034. Put 
simply, Christensen filed meritless and redundant motions as the parties were in the midst 
of preparing for a jury trial as part of an aggressive litigation strategy to try to exhaust Rehn 
prior to trial. 
D. Christensen Has Wrongfully Used Attorney Liens in Attempts to Extort 
Exorbitant Fees from Former Divorce Clients like Rehn. 
This is not the first time that Mr. Christensen has wrongfully attempted to use an 
attorney lien to extract exorbitant amounts from his clients. See Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 
23, 11 205-206 (attempt by Christensen to obtain $2.1 Million through an attorney's lien 
defeated due to_ Christensen's violation of ethical rules and attorney lien statute); CFD 
Payson, LLC v. Christensen, 2015 UT App 251, 1,r 3, 11-13 (attempt by Christensen to 
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obtain $1.6 Million through an attorney's lien defeated due to fact that liened real property 
was not owned by the lienee nor distributed in the divorce decree); Dahl v. Christensen, 
2009 UT App 280 (where Christensen's attorney lien against a client found to be a 
wrongful lien); Christensen v. Black (In re Black), Nos. UT-02-065, UT-02-066, 2003 
Bankr. LEXIS 191, 4-5 (U.S. B.A.P. 10th Cir. Mar. 14, 2003) ($7,101 in sanctions awarded 
against Christensen for using his attorney lien to violate automatic bankruptcy stay of a 
former divorce client). This record of pathological abuse of attorney's lien power by 
Christensen proves that Christensen is a predator of his own clients, and it was error for 
the trial court to characterize Christensen's predation of Rehn as standard slander of title 
conduct. 
E. The Trial Court Erroneously Failed to Consider the Above Facts. 
When the trial court declined to award equitable attorney fees, the trial court did not ~, 
consider any of the above facts and circumstances. R. 3855. Christensen even concedes 
that the trial court failed to state whether it understood that Christensen was Rehn's 
attorney. See Christensen's Brief at 48. The trial court characterized Christensen's conduct 
as a run-of-the-mill slander of title case, without any reference to the attorney/client 
relationship that existed when Christensen first slandered Rehn' s title. Id. But, in a normal 
slander of title case, the tortfeasor is not subject to duties of impeccable honesty or 
undivided loyalty to the person he is preying upon. Because the trial court apparently failed 
to take into consideration the heinous nature of Christens' acts, and Christensen's attempt 
to exhaust Rehn in litigation, it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to deny Mr. 
Rehn's request for an equitable award of attorney fees. This Court should reverse the trial 
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comis' decision and order that equitable attorneys' fees be awarded in an amount to be 
determined by the trial cou11. 
F. Christensen's Arguments Regarding Attornev's Fees Are Unsupported 
and Meritless. 
Cluistensen argues that under the "American Rule," attorney fees are "per se not 
recoverable as damages," and he relies upon Neff v. Neff, 2011 UT 6. But Ne.ff actually 
refutes Christensen's position and favors Rehn's position. The Utah Supreme Cow1 
expressly stated in Neff. 
[B]ecause our cases acknowledge the possibility that att0111ey fees can form 
the basis of damages in a slander of title claim, so long as those fees are 
reasonably necessary to remove disparaging clouds from the slandered title. 
This is an exception to our general rule for awarding attorney fees in 
tort cases. 
Neff v. Neff, 2011 UT 6, ,r 45 (emphasis supplied). Thus, attorney fees on slander of title 
claims are a recognized exception to the American Rule, and thus are not per se 
unrecoverable as damages. 
Christensen also contends that equity must follow the law when there is a conflict 
between law and equity, and Christensen invokes Stroud v. Stroud for support. 738 P.2d 
649 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). However, that principle is not applicable here, and Stroud is 
readily distinguishable from this case. The first difference is that Stroud concerns a divorce 
where the parties disputed the amount of interest on unpaid child support. See id. at 649. 
Specifically, the relevant statute allowed the trial court to increase, but not lower or 
eliminate, the rate of interest on child support payments for equitable reasons, but the 
defendant sought to have the court stay the accrual of interest altogether for equitable 
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reasons. Id. at 650. In that instance, the equitable principles directly contradicted express 
statutory law. See id. at 650-1. Here, there is no such contradiction. Even Clu·istensen 
aclmowledges that the law allows a trial comt to grant attorney fees on equitable grounds. 
Thus, the piinciples of equity are not in conflict with the law, and nothing prevented the 
trial court from awarding equitable attorney fees. 
Clnistensen argues that he was entitled to something for his previous representation 
of Rehn. This flies in the face of Rehn's discharge of Christensen's debt in bankruptcy. ~ 
Once Mr. Rehn' s debt to Christensen was discharged in bankruptcy, Rehn' s legal debt was 
extinguished. 
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST CHRISTENSEN WAS PROPER AND 
SUPPORTED BY UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE. 
Christensen argues that the trial court shc~mld not have established the first two 
elements of slander of title (I) publication of slanderous statement disparaging title, and 2) 
statement was false) because Christensen had an attorney's lien and a consensual lien. 
Christensen is wrong on each of his arguments. 
A. Christensen's Recording of a False Lien makes a Right to Lien 
Irrelevant. 
Whether Christensen possessed an attorney's lien or a consensual lien is irrelevant 
because it does not change the fact that the first two elements of a slander of title were 
established by hard evidence. Specifically, the hard evidence established that ~1 
Christensen's Lien contained numerous false statements. R. 389-93. Christensen admitted 
that the Lien contained false statements and that Christensen knew these statements were 
false. Christensen's Brief at 14. A glaring example of this is that Christensen falsely stated 
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in the Lien that the Property was "awarded to" Relm "in the Divorce Decree." R. 1063. 
As Rehn's divorce attorney, Christensen, more than anyone, else knew that the Divorce 
Decree specifically stated that no real property was involved. R. 538. Thus, whether or 
not there was a 1ight to lien is irrelevant because the Lien falsely states that Reim received 
the Property in the divorce, and Christensen knew that to be false. This is just one of the 
numerous false statements in the Lien. The undisputed evidence also clearly established 
that Cluistensen's Lien was impeding and jeopardizing a pending sale ofRehn's Property. 
R. 634-636. Therefore, it is irrelevant whether Christensen had a valid right to a lien 
because Christensen knew that the Lien he recorded contained false statements, and 
because that Lien was disparaging Rehn's title. 
B. Christensen Did Not have a Valid Attorney's Lien. 
i. The Property was not "Owned" by Rehn during the Divorce. 
Christensen had no right to record an attorneys' lien against the Property. UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 38-2-7 limits the property that attorneys may lien to "property owned by the 
client that is the subject of or connected with work performed for the client." See UTAH 
CODE ANN.§ 38-2-7 (emphasis supplied). 
In this case, the Property was not "owned" by Mr. Rehn at any time during his 
divorce, nor was the Property the subject of, or connected with, Rehn's divorce, the 
subsequent appeal, or his dispute with Hertz. The divorce court specifically found that, 
because neither Rehn nor his wife owned any real property, no real property was at issue 
in the· divorce. R. 53 8. The undisputed facts also established that Rehn did not have a 
contractually protected future interest in the Property at the time of his divorce. The 
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previous owner of the Property confirmed that Rehn did not even rent the Prope11y until 
1997, and that Rehn never even discussed the sale of the Prope11yuntil over two years after 
Rehn's divorce trial. R. 529-530. The deed between Rehn and Lindell also proves that 
Rehn did not actually acquire the Prope1ty until February of 2000, which was long after 
any representation terminated with respect to the divorce action and the subsequent appeal. 
R. 526-527. This hard evidence shows that Property was neither the subject of, nor 
~I 
connected with, the divorce, appeal, or Hertz representations. Because there is no ~ 
connection between the Property and the attorney's fees referenced in the Lien, the 
Attorney's Lien Statute did not bestow a right upon Christensen to lien the Property. 
ii. The Property was Not Connected with Christensen's 
Representation of Rehn in the Divorce. 
Christensen argues that the Property was "connected with" Rehn's divorce by way 
of a purported 15-minute conversation between Christensen and Rehn in which Christensen 
purportedly told Rehn not to purchase any property until after the divorce. This self-
serving statement by Christensen is not only insufficient on its face to create a connection, 
it is just not plausible. At trial, Christensen admitted that: (a) Christensen had no 
cL.1 
documentation of the alleged conversation (R. 3944 at 162:8-13); (b) Christensen did not ~ 
know what time, day, month, or even the season of year that the conversation allegedly 
occurred (id. at 162:1-21); and (c) Christensen did not know whether the alleged 
conversation was in person or over the telephone (id. at 162:17-19). Christensen also 
admitted under oath that the "legal fee value" of a pmported 15-minute conversation 
between Rehn and Christensen regarding future property was approximately $30.00 R. ~) 
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513. Rehn paid Christensen far more than this $30.00 before the lien was ever filed. R. 
3941 at 85:3-24. Thus, even if the conversation occun-ed, the trial comi correctly 
concluded that other than the 15-minute conversation, the Prope1iy was not connected with 
the divorce in any way, and that Reim had already paid Chtistensen in full for legal time 
the purported conversation took, and that Christensen was not entitled to lien the property 
for more than $26,000. Id. at 77:2-78:8. 
But, even if Christensen had advised Rehn during divorce litigation about acquiring 
future property that 'off the cuff advice does not open the door to allowing an attorney to 
record liens for omnibus attorney fees against all future properties acquired by a client. 
Otherwise, the confining language of the Attorney's Lien Statute would essentially be 
meaningless. 
iii. The Property was Not the Marital Home. 
Christensen argues that the Property was the marital home in Rehn's divorce. 
Christensen never made this argument to the trial court. In Utah, appellate courts do not 
consider issues first raised on appeal absent plain error or exceptional circumstances. See, 
e.g., State v. Tingey, 2014 UT App 228, ,r 3. 
Rehn's ex-wife filed for divorce in 1996. R. 3 at iJ 11 and 314 at if 11. Rehn did 
not begin living at the Property as a renter until July of 1997. R. 529-530, 679. Three 
weeks after Rehn began renting the Property, the divorce trial took place. R. 1063. The 
divorce court expressly stated that there was "no real property owned by the parties and 
thus no allocation is necessary." R. 5-6; 390-391; 3944, 113:15-114:4, 156:1-158:6, 
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160:24-161:7 Put simply, the Prope1ty is where Rehn went to live after he moved out of 
the marital home. 
iv. Christensen's Case Law is Inapplicable. 
Christensen relies heavily upon this Comt's opinion in Bay Harbor Farm, LC v. 
Sumsion, but Christensen's reliance is misplaced. 2014 UT App 133. Procedurally, 
Christensen did not cite Bay Harbor Farm until Christensen moved to reconsider the 
Court's prior summary judgment ruling by way of a second summary judgment motion. b 
R. 675-711; 1995; 3943 at 29:3-25. Because Christensen only raised Bay Harbor Farm in 
a motion to reconsider, this Court reviews the trial court's decision regarding that case for 
an abuse of discretion. See Murdock v. Springville Mun. Corp., 1999 UT 39, iJ 22. 
The sole issue in Bay Harbor was the interpretation of Utah's Wrongful Lien Act. 
See Bay Harbor, 2014 UT App 133 at 16. In that case, this Court evaluated the use of a 
"good faith'' defense in the context of the summary proceeding provided for by Utah's 
Wrongful Lien Act. See id. at iJ 12. In the present case, whether the Defendants' Lien was 
wrongful under the Utah's Wrongful Lien Act is not an issue being appealed, and the order 
being appealed from is not from a summary proceeding under Utah's Wrongful Lien Act. 
Moreover, the attorney in Bay Harbor Farms liened property that was owned by the 
attorney's client during the representation at issue and that was directly related to the legal 
C:.:_,: 
service being provided. See id. at 1il 1-2. Mr. Rehn never owned the Property during any v 
phase of Christensen's divorce representation. The trial court correctly recognized that 
Bay Harbor Farm does not extend as far as Christensen suggests. R. 3943 at 29:3-25. 
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A case with much more similar facts to the present case is CFD Payson, LLC v. 
Christensen, which ironically involved Mr. Christensen as the Defendant. 2015 UT App 
251. In CFD Payson, Mr. Clu-istensen recorded an attorney's lien for $1.6 Million against 
a parcel in which Christensen claimed that his fonner divorce client, Ms. Dahl, held an 
interest. See id. at 1 3. When CFD Payson demanded that Mr. Christensen remove his 
lien, Cluistensen refused. Id. at 1 4. CFD Payson then filed a lawsuit for slander of title 
and declaratory judgment. Id. at 1 5. Mr. Christensen argued that his lien was proper 
because Ms. Dahl became an owner of the land by virtue of the divorce decree. Id. Mr. 
Christensen succeeded in convincing the trial court that he was c01Tect. Id. at 1 6. This 
Court, however, reversed the dismissal after concluding that Ms. Dahl was not personally 
awarded title to the subject land in the Divorce Decree. See id. at 119, 12-13. This Court 
reasoned that, 
For a marital asset to be distributed, the asset must be in the legal possession 
of one or both of the marital parties. Thus, assets in the rightful possession 
of a separate entity generally are not available for distribution. 
Id. at 110. As in Payson, Christensen attempted to lien a former divorce client's property 
when that property was not distributed to the client in the divorce. Given that the facts here 
present an even clearer case that the Property was not subject to an attorney's lien, this 
Court should once again conclude that Mr. Christensen had no right to lien a property that 
his former divorce client did not own, and that Christensen did not have a valid statutory 
attorney's lien. 
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v. Christensen's Violations of the Attorney Lien Statute Invalidated 
his Lien. 
Christensen's Lien on the Prope1ty is invalid because Cln·istensen violated the 
procedural requirements of the Attorney's Lien Statute. Attomey's liens, like mechanic's 
liens, are creatures of statute, and a lien claimant cannot acquire a lien "unless the claimant 
has complied with the statutory provisions creating the lien." Utah Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 366 
P.2d 598,600 (Utah 1961), see also Phillips v. Smith, 768 P.2d 449,452 (Utah 1989). "A 
lien cannot be acquired unless the claimant complies with the statutory provisions." First 
Sec. Mtg. Co. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 919, 921-22 (Utah 1981), see also In re Brussow, 2012 
UT 53, ,r 27 n.23 (emphasizing the importance of complying with the Attorney Lien ~ 
Statute). This compliance requirement is strictly enforced. See id. 
With regard to lien verification, the Utah Supreme Court has declared that, 
''Verification is not a hypertechnicality that we can discount. Without verification, no lien 
is created." First Sec. Mtg. Co. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 919, 922 (Utah 1981). Utah's 
Attorney's Lien Statute required Christensen to include a verification on the Lien that the 
attorney issued a demand for payment, and that the demand was not paid within 30 days of 
the demand. See UTAH CODE ANN.§ 38-2-7(5)(c). The Lien contains no such verification. 
R. 1063. Instead, the Lien states that Christensen only became entitled to the liened amount 
on June 30, 2001, i.e., 25 days before Christensen recorded the Lien. Because Christensen 
failed to satisfy the verification requirement of the Attorney's Lien Statute, Christensen did 
not have a valid attorney's lien. 
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The Attorney's Lien Statute also requires that, "Within 30 days after filing the notice 
of lien, the attorney shall deliver or mail by ce1iified mail to the client a copy of the notice 
of lien." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-2-7(6) (emphasis supplied). Christensen recorded the 
Lien on July 25, 2001, and he admitted that he did not send notice to Rehn until 60 days 
later. R. 1063 and 977. Christensen also admitted that he did not send any notice by 
certified mail. R. 978. Christensen's admissions establish that Christensen violated the 
notice provisions of the Attorney's Lien Statute and the Lien was rendered void by the lack 
of proper notice. 
vi. Compliance with the Attorney's Lien Statute was Critical. 
Christensen argues that it was not necessary to comply with the notice requirements 
because the Attorney's Lien Statute provides for an automatic lien and makes notice 
optional. Christensen's argument, however, would render a large portion of the statute 
meaningless, and courts are to "interpret statutes to give meaning to all parts, and avoid 
rendering portions of the statute superfluous." See LKL Assocs. v. Farley, 2004 UT 51, iJ 
7 and Summit Operating, LLC v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2012 UT 91, iJ 11. What the 
Statute actually states is that an attorney has a right, but not an obligation, to record an 
attorney's lien. But once the attorney elects to record an attorney's lien, then the attorney 
must provide proper notice of the lien to the property owner, and that the notice "shall" 
include, among other things: 
[A] verification that the property is the subject of or connected with work 
performed by the attorney for the client and that a demand for payment of 
amounts owed to the attorney for the work has been made and not been paid 
within 30 days of the demand. 
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UTAH CODE ANN.§ 38-2-7(5)(c) (emphasis supplied). 
Christensen then argues that even if he violated a statutory notice requirement, his 
failure to comply with the stahltory requirements of the Attorney's Lien Statute does not 
invalidate the Lien. That argument would again render the provisions of the Attorney's 
Lien Statute superfluous, which is contrary to Utah law. LKL Assocs. v. Farley, 2004 UT 
51, 17. Christensen's argument also contradicts Utah's firmly established requirement that 
lienors must strictly comply with the stahltory lien requirements. See, e.g., First Sec. Mtg. ~ 
Co., 631 P.2d at 921-22. 
Christensen cites State v. Moreno for the proposition that courts should construe 
statutes in the same title in harmony with each other. 2009 UT 15, ,r I 0. Christensen then 
goes on to argue that there are two notice provisions within Title 38, one applying to lien 
notices generally and the other specifically to attorney's liens. Christensen then argues that 
because a failure to meet the general notice requirements does not invalidate a lien, a failure 
to meet the notice requirements of the Attorney's Lien Statute should likewise not be fatal 
to a lien. Christensen's argument is flawed in several respects. 
First, Moreno suggests that the provisions within the same chapter should be read 
harmoniously, and not provisions within the same title as Christensen argues. See Moreno, 
2009 UT 15 at ,J 10. A title in the Utah Code contains numerous legislative acts, and those 
acts do not necessarily relate to one another. Second, if the general notice provision in 
Title 38 were functionally identical to the notice provisions in the Attorney's Lien Statute, 
the latter would be superfluous, and that is a disfavored result. LKL Assocs. v. Farley, 2004 
UT 51, ,J 7. Third, the general notice requirement expressly states that it does not apply to 
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"any other liens subject to the same or stricter notice requirements than those imposed [by 
this section.]" UTAH CODE ANN.§ 38-12-102(3)(k). For all of these reasons, Clu-istensen's 
application of Moreno is invalid. 
vii. Christensen's False Statements are More than Irregularities. 
Christensen argues that his misrepresentations in the Lien are mere "irregularities" 
that do not render the Lien unenforceable. Christensen's statements, however, are far more 
than mere "irregularities." In the Lien, Christensen misrepresented: (a) the basis for the 
Lien; (b) how and when Rehn obtained the Property; ( c) the amount of the Lien; ( d) the 
statute purportedly authorizing the Lien; ( e) the legal representation leading to the Lien; 
and (f) who Rehn had actually hired. Had Christensen made accurate statements in the 
Lien, he would not have been able to give the Lien the facial appearance of a properly 
lodged attorney's lien that related back years and the encumbered property awarded to a 
client through the attorney's effort. 
C. Christensen Did Not Possess A Consensual Lien. 
i. Christensen Judicially Admitted there was No Consensual Lien 
and Subsequently Confirmed that Judicial Admission. 
Christensen argues that the trial court construed Christensen's admission too 
broadly as referring to all of the Appellees. Christensen's Answer to Paragraph 114 states: 
"Defendants admit that there was no signed agreement authorizing the filing of the lien but 
deny any other allegations of fact in this paragraph." R. 324. Christensen defined the term 
"Defendants" as including Mr. Christensen, SSC, CCP, and HC. R. 313. It would 
contradict Christensen's plainly stated definition to read the term "Defendants" as only 
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applying to SSC and Mr. Christensen. Thus, the trial court construed Christensen's judicial 
admission exactly as Christensen wrote it, and Christensen affinnatively admitted that none 
of the Defendants possessed a contractual lien right. 
Mr. Christensen and the other Defendants/Appellees are all experienced litigators. 
They knew all too well that, '" an admission of fact in a pleading is a judicial admission 
and is normally conclusive on the party making it."' Lawrence v. Intermountain, Inc., 201 O 
UT App 313, if 13 n.5 (quoting Baldwin v. Vantage Corp., 676 P.2d413, 415 (Utah 1984)). ~ 
The fact that Christensen confirmed the judicial admission by withdrawing his Motion to 
Amend the judicial admission demonstrates that the Judicial Admission was no accident. 
Christensen stated in that Withdrawal that "Counsel has reviewed the matter and has 
determined that an amendment is not needed." R. 1949. The trial court then made a 
specific finding that "the Defendants have judicially admitted that there was no contractual 
right to record a lien." R. 1957. This Court should confirm the trial court's finding that 
Cbristensenjudicially admitted that there was no contractual, and thus no consensual, right 
to a lien. 
Christensen argues that admissions in an Answer should only extend to the language 
asserted in the Complaint, but Christensen cites no authority whatsoever for this 
proposition. Moreover, in this case that would contradict the plain language of 
~i 
Christensen's Answer in which he specifically defined "Defendants" and then stated that <t, 
the "Defendants" had no contractual right to a lien. Christensen quotes the 90-year-old 
Geros v. Harries, 236 P. 220 (Utah 1925) case, but Geros states that the Complaint should 
be considered as a whole. Id. at 222. Admissions and Denials stated in an Answer are not 
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subject to the same "na1Tative" interpretation because admissions and denials do not create 
a naITative account. 
ii. Christensen's Judicial Admission is Consistent with the 
Engagement Letter and the Lien. 
Christensen's judicial admission that no contractual right to a lien existed is further 
bolstered by the Engagement Letter he drafted for Mr. Rehn to execute. In the Engagement 
Letter, _Christensen stated that his right to an attorney's lien was "as permitted by the laws 
of the State of Utah." R. 1134. This kind of provision in a representation agreement is 
what attorneys use to reference Utah's Attorney's Lien Statute. R. 3941 at 78:9-23. The 
Engagement Letter does not create a separate lien right; rather, it alerts the client to the 
attorney's right to lien under Utah's Attorney Lien Statute. 
The Lien itself demonstrates that Christensen construed his Engagement Letter as 
only referencing the attorney's statutory lien right. That is why he drafted the Lien to appear 
to be an attorney's lien under Utah's Attorney's Lien Statute rather than a consensual lien. 
R. 1063. Instead of referencing a contractual right to lien, the Lien itself plainly states, 
[Tlhe undersigned holds and claims a lien by virtue of the provision of 
Section 78-51-41, Utah Code Ann., 1953, which entitles the undersigned 
to the lien described above. 
R. 1063 ( emphasis supplied). When he was deposed, Mr. Christensen admitted that when 
he drafted the Lien, it was not based on a contract but rather on Utah's Attorney Lien 
Statute. R. 3944 at 199:23-200:23. Given the fact that Christensen's JudicJal Admission 
is consistent with his deposition testimony and the declaration in the Lien itself, it is 
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untenable for Christen to suggest that his judicial admission was misinterpreted by the Trial 
Comi. 
D. The Trial Court's Summary Judgment Ruling Does Not Constitute 
Harmful Error because Rehn Established at Trial that the Lien was 
False, and that the Lien Disparaged Rehn 's Title. 
Christensen argues that the trial court's summary judgment rnling was harmful 
error, but the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, 
'An error is harmful if, absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, [if] our 
confidence in the verdict ... is undermined.' 
State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, 115 (quoting State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46,137). 
In this case, a jury found that Christensen acted with malice. Christensen admitted 
under cross-examination at trial that the Lien contained many "errors" and that Mr. 
Christensen knew of these "errors." See, e.g., R. 3944 at 187:21- 189:9; 190:13- 192:18; 
193:8-194:11; 194:18-195:23; 196:9-197:7, See also Christensen's Brief at 14. Mr. 
Christensen also testified at trial that he was aware that the Lien was interfering with Rehn 
selling the Property. R. 3944 at 208:6-21. Thus, even if the trial court had not previously 
determined on summary judgment that the false statements and disparagement had been 
established, Rehn established those elements at trial. The evidence of falsity, and 
knowledge of the falsity was sufficient to convince the jury to find him guilty of acting 
with malice. There was no harmful error. 
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IV. REHN AMPLY ESTABLISHED MALICE AT TRIAL. 
Christensen argues that Rehn failed to prove that Mr. Clu·istensen knew the Lien 
was false and unenforceable, and that Rehn then failed to prove that Cluistensen acted with 
malice. Under Utah law, 
Malice 'may be implied where a party knowingly and wrongfully publishes 
something untrue or spwious under circumstances that it should reasonably 
foresee might result in damage to the owner of the property.' 
Dillon v. S. Mgmt, Corp. Retirement Trust, 2014 UT 14, if 36 (quoting First Sec. Bank v. 
Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Utah 1989)). Christensen has conceded that 
Rehn established at trial that the Lien contained false statements and that Mr. Christensen 
knew of these false statements. Christensen's Brief at 14. 
What Christensen argued in his directed verdict motion was that Rehn failed to 
prove that Christensen actually knew that it was an ''unenforceable false lien." R. 3944 at 
123: 17-124:5. But the trial record is chock full of evidence that Christensen knew the Lien 
was unenforceable. That evidence included: i) Christensen's falsification of virtually every 
aspect of the Lien to make it appear like an amendment to an earlier recorded attorney's 
line that never existed See, e.g., id at 187:21-197:7; ii) Christensen's decision to withhold 
notice of the Lien from Rehn Id at 173:8-175:18, 177:4-13; 261:25-262: 3; iii) 
Christensen's subsequent drafting of a letter dissembling about the purpose of the Lien. Id 
at 179:3-15; 182:4-22. These facts, combined with the fact that Christensen was an 
attorney at the time, provide more than sufficient evidence to imply to a jury that 
Christensen lmew the Lien was unenforceable when Christensen recorded it. The fact that 
the Lien states the Property was awarded to Rehn in the divorce action, R. 1063, is itself 
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sufficient to supp01i a jury finding of malice. No one would know better than Christensen 
(as Rehn's divorce attorney) that his statement is a bold faced lie. R 3944 at 192:10-18. 
Christensen,s reliance upon Dillon v. S. Mgmt., Corp. Retirement Trust, 2014 UT 
14 is misplaced. In Dillon, the Utah Supreme Comi merely restated prior opinions when 
it addressed slander of title, such as those found in First Sec. Bank v. Banberry Crossing, 
780 P.2d 1253 (Utah 1989). See id. at if 36. Moreover, in Dillon, the Utah Supreme Court 
concluded that a slander of title did occur because the evidence demonstrated implied ~ 
malice and actual knowledge. See id. at iJiJ 38-40. Thus, Dillon actually favors the 
Plaintiffs by demonstrating the various ways malice may be proven. 
Christensen's reliance upon First Sec. Bank v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253 
(Utah 1989) is likewise misplaced. Although the Utah Supreme Court did not conclude 
malice existed, it gave an even broader definition of malice: 
Malice may be implied where a party knowingly and wrongfully records or 
publishes something untrue or spurious or which gives a false or misleading 
impression adverse to one's title under circumstances that it should 
reasonably foresee might result in damage to the owner of the property. 
Id. at 1257 (emphasis supplied). 
In Banberry, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that the inaccuracies were 
inadvertent and subsequently corrected when discovered. See id. In contrast, Christensen 
refused to release any portion of the Lien when he was notified it was false. R. 3944 at 
209:8-210: 17 11 at iJ 84 and R. 321 at if 84. Instead, he started demanding even more 
money to release the Lien. 
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Given these facts and the highly deferential standard of review, Christensen cannot 
overcome his substantial burden. State v. Hawkins, 2016 UT App 9, ,r 32. The Comt 
should affinn the jury's finding that Clu·istensen acted with malice. 
V. CHRISTENSEN PRODUCED NO EVIDENCE REGARDING THE 
REASONABLENESS OF REHN'S ATTORNEY FEES. 
Christensen argues that Rehn' s fees are um·easonable, but Christensen never 
provided any evidence regarding the unreasonableness ofRehn's attorney fees. Indeed, it 
is ironic that Mr. Christensen is arguing about the reasonableness of atto1ney fees, when 
the Utah Supreme Comt has previously chastised Mr. Christensen for seeking over $2.1 
Million in patently unreasonable attmney fees, and refen-ed Mr. Christensen to the Office 
of Professional Conduct for violating several ethical duties in seeking to obtain 
unreasonable fees. Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 23, il1 175-211. 
At trial, the jury was directed to detennine ifRehn's attorney fees were reasonably 
necessary. R. 3866. Christensen did not object to this instruction. Id. During the 
evidentiary portion of trial, the jury reviewed Rehn's actual billing records and detailed 
billing entries. Id. Rehn solicited detailed testimony from one of his attorneys, Jared C. 
Bowman, regarding the reasonableness of these fees. Id. Christensen cross-examined that 
attorney. Christensen then failed to present any other evidence suggesting that the fees 
were unreasonable. Id. Christensen did not call an attorney as an expert or have Mr. 
Christensen opine on the reasonableness of Rehn' s fees. See id. Instead, Christensen 
relied entirely on argument and a "vigorous cross-examination" of Mr. Relm's attorney. 
Id. The jury heard Christensen's arguments and the jury heard Christensen's cross-
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examination. R. 3866-3867. The jury also had all ofRehn's billing entries to pour over in 
the jury room during deliberation. R. 3867. Because the only evidence provided at trial 
supported the reasonableness ofRehn's att01ney fees, and no evidence suppo11ed a contrary 
finding, substantial evidence precluded the trial comt from granting Christensen's Motion 
for a JNOV. Id. 
On Appeal, Christensen once again attempts to overturn the jury's verdict without 
any evidence. Where all of the evidence supports the jury's verdict, and no evidence 
refutes it, Christensen cannot show that there is "no basis in the evidence, including 
reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom, to support the jury's determination." 
ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2013 UT 24, ,r 18. Accordingly, the jury's 
verdict must be affirmed. 
VI. CONCLUSION. 
This case is but the latest in what is becoming a long line of appellate decisions 
dealing with attorney Steve Christensen's misuse of his attorney lien power against his own 
clients. What is so alarming about Christensen's conduct in the present case is the extent 
to which Christensen set out to manufacture and record a patently fraudulent lien and then 
lie about the purpose of the lien when he got caught. He then refused to release the Lien 
unless Mr. Rehn paid an exorbitant release. price. When Mr. Rehn refused to be extorted, 
Christensen tried to exhaust Mr. Rehn in litigation. There can be no more reprehensible 
conduct by an attorney than this kind of deceit and abuse of power, and the growing body 
of appellate decisions documenting Christensen's abuse of his attorney lien power suggests 
that there is something fundamentally wrong with Christensen. For all of the foregoing 
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reasons, this Court should reverse: (1) the trial comi's denial of an award of attorney fees 
to Rehn; (2) order the trial court to award Rehn his attorney fees incun-ed in prevailing 
against Christensen's attempt to enforce the Engagement Letter's right to lien provision; 
and (3) direct the trial com1 to award Rehn his attorney fees incun-ed in this appeal. With 
regard to Clnistensen's Cross-Appeal, the Court should: (a) affinn the trial court's 
summary judgment ruling that the first two elements of Rehn' s slander of title claim were 
established; (b) affirm the trial court's denial of Christensen's Motion for a Directed 
Verdict; (c) affirm the trial court's denial of Christensen's Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Rehn respectfully requests oral argument on this appeal. 
-DATED this 9th day of March, 2016. 
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